Abstract. Since the seminal work of Garg et al. (FOCS'13) in which they proposed the first candidate construction for indistinguishability obfuscation (iO for short), iO has become a central cryptographic primitive with numerous applications. The security of the proposed construction of Garg et al. and its variants are proved based on multi-linear maps (Garg et al. Eurocrypt'13) and their idealized model called the graded encoding model (Brakerski and Rothblum TCC'14 and Barak et al. Eurocrypt'14). Whether or not iO could be based on standard and well-studied hardness assumptions has remain an elusive open question. In this work we prove lower bounds on the assumptions that imply iO in a black-box way, based on computational assumptions. Note that any lower bound for iO needs to somehow rely on computational assumptions, because if P = NP then statistically secure iO does exist. Our results are twofold:
Introduction
The celebrated work of Barak et al. [3] initiated a formal study of the notion of program obfuscation which is the process of making programs unintelligible while preserving their functionalities. The main result of [3] was indeed a negative one showing that a strong form of obfuscation, called virtual black-box obfuscation, is indeed impossible for general circuits. The same work [3] also defined a weaker notion of obfuscation, called indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). The security of iO only requires that the obfuscation of two equivalent and same-size circuits C 1 , C 2 should be computationally indistinguishable in the eyes of efficient adversaries.
The first candidate construction for iO was presented in the breakthrough work of Gentry et al. [12] . [12] showed how to construct iO for NC 1 circuits based on multi-linear assumptions [11] , and also showed how to boost iO for NC 1 to iO for general circuits based on the learning with error (LWE) assumption [33] . The work of [12] led to an active area with a long list of results using iO as a "central hub" [36] for cryptographic tasks/primitives and basing them on iO together with one-way functions or other (relatively weak) standard assumptions. Interestingly, as shown by [23] the one-way function itself could be based on iO and the worst-case assumption that NP = BPP, leading to tens of applications solely based on iO and NP = BPP. 3 Assumptions behind iO. Since the first candidate construction of iO was presented by [12] a few other variants of this constructions with different assumptions have been presented. Brakerski and Rothblum [8] showed that in an idealized model based on multilinear maps, known as the graded encoding model one can achieve iO (or even VBB obfuscation) assuming the bounded speedup hypothesis. Barak et al. [2] improved the result of [8] by making the construction unconditionally secure in the graded encoding model. Miles et al. [27] took another step in this direction by making the construction even more secure by allowing unlimited additions across different encoding "levels". Pass et al. [32] con-structed iO for NC 1 circuits based on (subexponentially secure) semanticallysecure multilinear encodings. Their work was the first result basing iO on falsifiable assumptions [29] , however they relied on super-polynomial assumptions. Gentry et al. [15] construct iO based on subgroup elimination assumptions.
Despite all the efforts mentioned above to base iO on hardness assumptions, the assumptions behind the constructions of iO seem to be qualitatively different compared to other cryptographic primitives, even in comparison with very powerful primitives such as fully homomorphic encryption [35, 14] which could be constructed from LWE [9] . The recent beautiful work of [1] proved the first limitation on the power of iO by ruling out constructions of collision-resistant hash functions from iO and OWF (even if iO uses OWF in a non-black-box way).
To the best of our knowledge, no lower-bounds on the complexity of the assumptions behind iO are proved yet. The same work of [1] ruled out fully black-box constructions of iO from private-key functional encryption schemes (PFE), but this result requires the iO to also handle circuits with PFE gates. We note, however, that obfuscating circuits in plain model with no oracle gates is in fact sufficient for all applications of iO. Moreover, since iO exists if NP = P, any lower bound on the complexity of (standard definition of) iO in which we only aim at obfuscating circuits in the plain model needs to rely on computational assumptions (unless we first prove NP = P).
In this work we initiate a formal study on the assumption complexity of iO from a lower-bound perspective. 4 We prove our results in the black-box framework of Impagliazzo and Rudich [21] and its refinements by Reingold et al. [34] . Lower bounds against black-box constructions/reductions are considered fundamental due to the abundance of black-box techniques as well as their (typical) efficiency advantage over their non-black-box counterparts.
Since applications of iO almost always lead to non-black-box constructions, it could be argued that a black-box separation for iO is not meaningful. Note, however, that in this work we are not studying which primitives could be constructed from iO in a black-box way. We are instead looking at the complexity of assumptions behind iO. An instructive analogy is zero knowledge proofs for NP (ZKP). Using ZKPs for general NP statements also makes constructions non-black-box (since some piece of code is used as witness used by the prover) yet, we can indeed construct ZKPs for NP from one-way functions in a fully black-box way [17, 28, 18] .
5 Therefore, even though iO leads to non-back-box constructions, the construction of iO itself could very much be black-box, and so separating it from classical primitives is also meaningful.
Our Results
Our first lower bound holds for any primitive implied by a random oracle (e.g., exponentially secure one-way functions or collision-resistant hash functions) and it is proved for fully black-box constructions that treat the primitive and the adversary in a black-box way (see Definition 5) .
Theorem 1 (Fully black-box separation from primitives implied by random oracle). Unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, there is no fully black-box construction of iO from collision-resistant hash functions or more generally any primitive implied by a random oracle in a black-box way.
Intuition behind the proof. To prove theorem 1 we will first prove a useful lemma (see Lemma 17) which, roughly speaking, asserts that for any pair of circuits C 1 , C 2 , either (1) a (computationally unbounded) polynomial-query attacker can guess which one is obfuscated in the random oracle model with a probability close to one, or that (2) there is a way to obfuscate them into the same output circuit B. The latter could be used as a witness that C 1 and C 2 compute the same function, assuming that the obfuscation is an iO. Now consider the set of equivalent and same-size circuit
If Case (1) happens for an infinite subset of C, we get a poly-query attacker against iO in the random oracle model which is sufficient for deriving the blackbox separations of Theorem 1. On the other hand, if Case (1) happens only for a finite subset of C, we get an efficient procedure to certify the equivalence of two given circuits, implying NP = P. We prove Lemma 17 by reducing it to a result by Mahmoody and Pass [25] who ruled out the existence of non-interactive commitments from one-way functions. Roughly speaking, we construct a noninteractive commitment scheme based on common input (C 1 , C 2 ) in the random oracle model, and we show that: the cheating receiver strategy of [25] implies our Case (1) , and the cheating sender strategy of [25] implies our Case (2) . The result of [25] shows that either of these strategies always exist. See Section 3 for the formal and detailed proof.
Our second lower bound does not rule out black-box construction of iO based on believable assumptions, but shows that achieving such constructions for a large variety of primitives is as hard has solving another long standing open question in cryptography; namely, basing public-key encryption on one-way functions. It also captures a larger class of security reductions known as semi-black-box reductions [34] that allow the security reduction to access the adversary in a non-black-box way (see Definition 6).
Theorem 2 (Hardness of semi-black-box construction). Let P be a primitive that provably exists relative to random trapdoor permutation oracle, the generic group model (for any finite abelian group) or the degree-O(1) graded encoding model (for any finite ring). Any semi-black-box construction of iO from P (constructively) implies a construction of semantically secure public-key encryption from one-way functions.
Primitives captured by Theorem 2. Theorem 2 captures a large set of powerful cryptographic primitives that could be constructed in idealized models. For example trapdoor permutations (and any primitive implied by TDPs in a blackbox way) trivially exist relative to the idealized model of random TDPs. Even primitives that we do not know how to construct from TDPs in a black-box way (e.g., CCA secure public key encryption) are known to exist in the random TDP model [5] . The generic group model defined by Shoup [37] (see Definition 12 ) is an idealized model in which (a black-box form of) the DDH assumption holds unconditionally. Therefore, our separation of Theorem 2 covers any primitive that could be constructed from DDH assumption in a black-box way. The same holds for bilinear assumptions in the graded encoding model (see Definition 13) of degree 2. Namely, primitives that could be constructed from bilinear assumptions (in a black-box way) exist in the degree O(1) graded encoding model unconditionally. This includes one-round 3-party key-agreement [22] , identity based encryption [7] , etc.
Intuition behind the proof. Our main tool in proving Theorem 2 is the following theorem which is implicit in the recent work of the authors [31, 24] . Even though the focus of [31, 24] is on virtual black-box obfuscation, the same construction presented in [31, 24] for the case of VBB implies the following theorem for iO.
Theorem 3 (Implicit in [31, 24] ). The existence of iO in any of the idealized models of: random trapdoor permutation oracle, generic group model for finite abelian groups, or the degree-O(1) graded encoding model for finite rings, implies 1/p(n)-approximate iO in the plain model for any polynomial p(n).
We then show that the existence of (1/6)-approximate iO and any one-way functions imply the existence of "approximately correct" and "approximately secure" public-key encryption schemes. In order to prove this we employ a construction of Sahai and Waters [36] using which which they showed that iO and OWF imply PKE. Here we show that the very same construction, when instantiated using approximate iO, leads to "approximately correct" and "approximately secure" public-key encryption. Finally we use a result of Holenstein [19] who showed how to amplify any approximately-correct and approximately-secure PKE into a full fledged (semantically secure) PKE for sufficiently good approximation! See Section 4 for the formal and detailed proof. Previous work on hardness of black-box constructions. Theorem 2 has the same spirit as the result by Impagliazzo and Rudich [21] who showed any semi-blackbox construction of key agreement from one-way functions would implies P = NP. Therefore, the fact that we are far from proving P = NP implies that we as far from basing key agreements on one-way functions in a black-box way. 6 Similarly, our Theorem 2 shows that as long as we are not able to base publickey encryption on one-way functions, we cannot base iO on a variety of strong primitives in a semi-black-box way. Other results of the same flavor exist in connection with program checkers [6] for NP. Mahmoody and Xiao [26] showed that any construction of one-way functions based on worst-case hardness of NP implies program checkers for NP whose existence is one of the long standing open questions in complexity theory.
Falsifiability of iO.
An intriguing open question regarding assumption complexity of iO is whether iO could be based on any "falsifiable" assumption [29] . A falsifiable assumption is one with an efficient challenger security game. The question is raised since an adversary attacking an iO scheme starts with proposing two equivalent circuits and and efficient challenger has no direct way to verify this. Since our primitives used in the theorems above are falsifiable, a separation of iO from falsifiable assumptions would imply our results for the case of polynomially secure primitives. However, constructions of iO based on exponentially secure falsifiable assumptions are indeed known [32] . Therefore, our results are interesting even if one can prove that iO cannot be based on falsifiable assumptions. Moreover, the known lower bounds against falsifiable assumptions [30, 16] are proved only for black-box proofs of security in which the adversary is used in a black-box way. Our Theorem 2 holds even for semi-black-box constructions in which the security reduction could use the adversary in a non-black-box manner.
Preliminaries
For circuits C, D, we denote by C ≡ D that they compute the same function. By |C| we denote the size of the bit representation of C. By a partial oracle f we denote an oracle that is only defined for a subset of possible queries. For random variables X, Y , by X ≈ Y we denote the fact that X and Y are distributed identically. We call a function (n) negligible if (n) < 1/p(n) for all polynomial p(·) and sufficiently large n. We call ρ(n) overwhelming, if 1 − ρ(n) is negligible.
Black-Box Constructions
Definition 5 (Fully black-box constructions [34] ). A fully black-box construction of a primitive Q from a primitive P consists of two PPT algorithms (Q, S) as follows:
1. Implementation: For any oracle P that implements P, Q P implements Q. 2. Security reduction: for any oracle P implementing P and for any (computationally unbounded) oracle adversary A successfully breaking the security of Q P , it holds that S P,A breaks the security of P .
Primitives with stronger hardness. The above definition is for polynomially secure primitives. When the used primitive P is s-secure for a more quantitative bound s(n) poly(n), the security reduction S could potentially run in longer running time as well so long as it holds that: when P, A are polynomial time, the total running time of the composed algorithm S P,A is also small enough to be considered a legal attack against the implementation P of P.
In the following more relaxed form of constructions, the security reduction can depend arbitrarily on the adversary but it still treats the implementation of the used primitive in a black-box way.
Definition 6 (Semi-black-box constructions [34] ). A semi-black-box construction of a primitive Q from a primitive P is defined similarly to the fully black-box Definition of 5 with the following difference in the security reduction:
-For any oracle P implementing P and any efficient oracle-aided adversary A P who breaks the security of Q P it holds that S P (A) breaks the security of P . Note that since A's description is efficient it could indeed be given to S in a non-black-box way.
Remark 7. The work of Reingold et al. [34] also defines a "∀∃" variant of the semi-black-box constructions in which S P can arbitrarily depend on A P (rather than depending on it in a unified way). In this work we work with the basic default variant that we also find more natural.
Efficiency of adversary. We used the term efficient in an unspecified way so that it could be applied to complexity classes beyond polynomial time. For example, using a quasi-polynomially secure primitive P to construct a polynomially secure primitive Q would require a security primitive that is more relaxed and could lead to a quasi-polynomial (as opposed to polynomial) time attack against P using any polynomial-time attacker against Q P .
Indistinguishability Obfuscation Definition 8 ([3]).
A PPT algorithm O is an indistinguishability obfuscator (iO) if the following two hold:
-Correctness: For every circuit C, it holds that Pr r [O r (C) ≡ C] = 1.
-Soundness: For every PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function α(·) such that for every pair of equivalent circuits C 1 ≡ C 2 with the same size
where the probability is over the random seeds of the obfuscator O, adversary A and the random bit b.
Definition 9 (Approximate iO).
A PPT O is called an -approximate iO if it satisfies the same soundness condition and the following modified correctness condition.
-Approximate correctness: Pr r,x [O r (C)(x) = C(x)] = (|C|) where the probability is over the randomness of the obfuscator as well as the randomly selected input.
Definition 10 (Fully and semi-black-box constructions of iO). A fully black-box construction of iO from primitive P consists of two oracle algorithms (O, S) such that -Implementation (correctness): For every oracle P implementing P, every circuit C, and every randomness r for O it holds that B = O P r (C) is an oracle-aided circuit B such that B P ≡ C. -Soundness: For any oracle P implementing P, any ≥ 1/ poly(n) and any oracle adversary A who -breaks O P , it holds that S P,A (1 1/ (n) ) breaks the security of P . We say that A -breaks O P if for an infinite number of pairs of equivalent circuits C 0 ≡ C 1 of equal lengths n it holds that
A semi-black-box construction of iO from P is defined similarly, with its soundness defined along the line of Definition 6. Namely, we require that for any efficient adversary A who -breaks O P , there is also an efficient adversary breaking the security of P .
Generic/Idealized Models
Definition 11 (Random Oracle Model). In the random oracle model, all parties have access to a randomized oracle f such that for each input x, the answer f (x) is uniformly (and independently of the rest of the oracle) distributed over {0, 1} |x| .
Definition 12 (Generic Group Model [37] ). Let (G, ) be any group of size N and let S be any set of size at least N . The generic group oracle I[G → S] (or simply I) is as follows. At first an injective random function σ : G → S is chosen, and two type of queries are answered as follows.
-Labeling Queries. Given g ∈ G oracle returns σ(g).
-Addition Queries. Given y 1 , y 2 , if there exists x 1 , x 2 such that σ(x 1 ) = y 1 and σ(x 2 ) = y 2 , it returns σ(x 1 x 2 ). Otherwise it returns ⊥.
Definition 13 (Degree-d Ideal Graded Encoding Model).
The oracle M d R = (enc, zero) is stateful and is parameterized by a ring R and a degree d and works in two phases. For each l the oracle enc(·, l) is a random injective function from the ring R to the set of labels S. Generic Algorithms. A generic algorithm in the generic group model (resp. graded encoding model) is an algorithm in which no label s is used in an addition (resp. zero testing) query unless it is previously obtained through the oracle itself. In this work we only use sparse encodings in which |S|/|G| = n ω (1) (resp. |S|/|R| = n ω (1) in the graded encoding model) where n is the security parameter. Therefore, the execution of poly-time algorithms in this model will be statistically close to being generic.
Definition 14 (Primitives in Idealized Models).
We say a primitive P exists relative to the randomized oracle (or idealized model) I if there is an oracle-aided algorithm P such that:
1. Completeness: For every instantiation I of I, it holds that P I implements P correctly. 2. Security: Let A be an oracle-aided adversary A I where the complexity of A is bounded by the specified complexity of the attacks for primitive P. For example if P is polynomially secure (resp., quasi-polynomially secure), then A runs in in polynomial time (resp., quasi-polynomial time). For every such oracle aided A, with measure one over the sampling of the idealized oracle I $ ← I, it holds that A does not break the security of P I .
We call P a black-box construction of P relative to I if the security property holds also in a "black-box" way defined as follows:
-Let A be an oracle-aided adversary A I where the query complexity of A is bounded by the specified complexity of the attacks for primitive P. For example if P is polynomially secure (resp., quasi-polynomially secure), then A only asks a polynomial (resp., quasi-polynomial) number of queries. For every such oracle aided A, with measure one over the sampling of the idealized oracle I $ ← I, it holds that A does not break the security of P I .
In the definition above, we only require the scheme to be secure after the adversary is fixed. This is along the line of the way the random oracle model is used in cryptography [5] , and lets us easily derive certain primitives in idealized models. For example it is easy to see that a random trapdoor permutation, with measure one, is a secure TDP against any fixed adversary of polynomial query complexity. Therefore, TDPs exist in the idealized model of random TDP in a black-box way. In fact stronger results are proved in the literature for other primitives. Impagliazzo and Rudich [21] and Gennaro and Trevisan [13] showed that one-way functions exist relative to the idealized model of random oracle, even if we sample the oracle first and then go over enumerating possible attacks. Chung et al. [10] proved a similar result for collision resistant hash functions.
The following lemma could be verified by inspection.
Lemma 15.
If there is a semi-black-box construction of Q from P then:
1. If P exists relative to idealized model I, Q exists relative to I as well. 2. If in addition the construction of P from I is black-box, then a black-box construction of Q relative to I exists as well.
Proof. Let Q be the semi-black-box construction of Q from P. Let P be the implementation of P relative to I. It is easy to see that Q P is an implementation of Q relative to I. Now we prove the security properties of Lemma 15.
1. Let A be any successful attacker against the implementation of Q P in the idealized model I. Then by non-zero measure over the choice of I $ ←I it holds that A breaks the security of Q P I . For any such I, the security reduction S I (A) also breaks the security of P I . This means that the attacker S(A) = B breaks the security of P I with non-zero measure over the sampled oracle I $ ← I. This contradicts the assumption that P is securely realized in I. 2. A similar proof holds for the black-box constructions in idealized models.
The only modification is that now we use B = S A (rather than S(A)).
Separating iO from Random Oracle Based Primitives
In this section we prove the following formalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 16 (Theorem 1 formalized).
If NP = co-NP then there is no fully black-box construction of iO from any primitive P that exists relative to a random oracle in a black-box way. This includes exponentially secure one-way functions and collision-resistant hash functions.
To prove Theorem 16 we will first prove a useful lemma (see Lemma 17) which, roughly speaking, asserts that for any pair of circuits C 1 , C 2 , either an attacker can guess which one is obfuscated in the random oracle model with a probability close to one, or that there is a way to obfuscate them into the same output circuit B. The latter could be used as a witness that C 1 and C 2 compute the same function, assuming that the obfuscation is an iO.
Lemma 17 (Distinguish or Witness).
Let O be an oracle aided randomized polynomial-time algorithm taking circuits as input such that for every lengthpreserving oracle f and every randomness r it holds that O 1. There is an infinite sequence of circuits (C 
where n is the bit size of the circuits:
We will first prove Theorem 16 using Lemma 17, and then we will prove Lemma 17.
Proof (of Theorem 16).
In what follows we will always assume NP = co-NP. We will describe the proof for one-way functions, but it can be verified that the very same proof holds for any primitive that holds relative to random oracles in a black-box way (see Definition 14) .
Suppose (O, S) is a fully black-box construction of iO from one-way functions. We use a random oracle f to implement the one-way function required by O. By Lemma 17 and the assumption that NP = co-NP we know that there is a computationally unbounded attacker A and an infinite sequence of equivalent and same-size circuits (C 2 ) over the choice of oracle f , it holds that the probability that A correctly guesses which one of (C i 0 , C i 1 ) is being obfuscated is at least 1/2 + . Since the summation i 1/i 2 = O(1) converges, by Borel-Cantelli lemma, for measure one of the random oracles f it holds that A -breaks the implemented iO O f . Now that A is a "legal" adversary, by definition of fully black-box iO, the security reduction S f,A shall break the one-way property of f . Algorithms A and S are both poly(n)-query attackers, and so the combination B = S A also asks only a polynomial number of queries to f and succeeds in breaking the one-wayness of f for nonzero measure of samples for f .
The existence of such B, however, is impossible since a random oracle f , with measure one, is secure against attackers who ask only a polynomial number of queries [21, 13] . Now we prove Lemma 17. To prove Lemma 17 we will use the following lemma from [25] . Lemma 18 ([25] ). Suppose S is an oracle-aided PPT algorithm that calls oracle f and takes private input b ∈ {0, 1}, randomness r, and common input
Hardness of Semi-Black-Box Constructions of iO
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. We will first show that approximate iO is still powerful enough to base public-key cryptography on private-key cryptography. We will use this result and results of [31, 24] to derive Theorem 2.
Theorem 20. The existence of (1/6)-approximate iO and any one-way functions imply the existence of semantically secure public-key encryption schemes.
We first prove Theorem 2 using Theorems 3 and 20.
Proof (of Theorem 2 using Theorems 3 and 20 ). Let P be any such primitive with implementation P relative to the idealized model I, and suppose O is any such semi-black-box construction of iO from P. By Lemma 15, we conclude that O = O P is a construction of iO in the idealized model I. This, together with Theorem 3 imply that there is a (1/6)-approximate iO in the plain model. Finally, by Theorem 20 and the existence of (1/6)-approximate iO implies that we can construct semantically secure public-key encryption from one-way functions.
Proving Theorem 20
In this section we prove that (1/6)-approximate iO and one-way functions imply semantically secure public-key encryption. Therefore, any provably secure construction of (1/6)-approximate iO would enable us to take any one-way functions and construct a secure public-key encryption scheme from it. In the terminology of [20] it means that Cryptomania collapses to Minicrypt if (1/6)-approximate iO exists.
Intuition. Sahai and Waters [36] showed that iO and OWF imply PKE. Here we show that the very same construction, when instantiated using approximate iO, leads to "approximately correct" and "approximately secure" public-key encryption. Then, using a result of [19] we amplify the soundness and correctness to get a full fledged semantically secure public key encryption scheme.
Definition 21 (Approximate correctness and security for PKE). We call a public-key bit-encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) for message space {0, 1} (n)-correct if
where the probability is over the randomness of the key generation, encryption, decryption, and the bit b. We call (Gen, Enc, Dec) δ(n)-secure if for any PPT adversary A, it holds that
where the probability is over the randomness of generation, encryption, the adversary, and bit b.
Holenstein [19] showed how to amplify any -correct and -secure PKE into a full fledged (semantically secure) PKE for sufficiently small . Theorem 22 (Implied by Corollary 7.8 in [19] ). Suppose (Gen, Enc, Dec) is -correct and δ-secure for constants , δ such that (1 − 2 ) 2 > 2δ. Then there exists a semantically secure PKE.
Theorem 23 below asserts that approximate iO and one-way functions imply approximately correct and approximately secure PKE.
Theorem 23 (Approximate iO + OWF ⇒ Approximate PKE). Ifapproximate iO and one-way functions exist, then there is an -correct and ( + negl(n))-secure public-key bit encryption scheme.
We first prove Theorem 20 using Theorem 23 and then will prove 23.
Proof (of Theorem 20) . Because (1 − 2 · 1/6) 2 > 2 · 1/6, Theorem 20 follows immediately from Theorem 22 and the following Theorem 23 using = 1/6.
In the rest of this section we prove Theorem 23.
Proof (of Theorem 23).
We show that the very same construction of PKE from iO and OWF presented by Sahai and Waters [36] , when instantiated with an -approximate iO, has the demanded properties of Theorem 23.
Properties of the construction of [36] . We first describe the abstract properties of the construction of [36] (for PKE using iO and OWFs) and its security proof that we need to know.
-Construction/correctness:
1. The key generation process generates a circuit C and publishes O(C) = B as public key where O is an iO scheme. 2. The encryption simply runs B on (r, b) where r is the encryption randomness and b is the bit to be encrypted. 3. The scheme has completeness 1. -Security: [36] proves the security of the construction above by showing that no PPT algorithm can distinguish between the following two random variables X 0 , X 1 defined as: C(r, b) ) where s is the randomness for O.
When clear from the context we drop the randomness s and simply write O(C) denoting it as a random variable over the randomness of O. It can be verified by inspection that the proof of [36] for indistinguishability of X 0 and X 1 does not rely on completeness of the obfuscation O and only relies on its indistinguishability (when applied to circuits with the same functions). We will rely on this feature of the proof of [36] in our analysis.
Below we analyze the correctness and security of the construction of [36] when O is an -approximate iO.
Correctness. By the definition of -approximate iO and -correct bit encryption, and the fact that the [36] construction has perfect completeness when O is iO, it follows that the completeness of the new scheme (when b is also chosen at random) is at least 1 − . Thus the scheme is -correct.
Security. First recall that for the basic construction of [36] using (perfect) iO, no PPT attacker A can guess b with probability better than 1/2 + negl(n) when b is chosen at random and A is given a sample from the random variable X b (for random b). As we mentioned above, the proof of this statement does not rely on the correctness of the used iO and only relies on its indistinguishability. The difference between Y b 's and X b 's stems from the fact that the public-key B = O(C) no longer computes the same exact function as the circuit C as the obfuscation only guarantees approximate correctness. We reduce the analysis of the new scheme to the original analysis of [36] .
By the analysis of [36] we already know that if any PPT A is given a sample from X b for a random b it has at most 1/2 + negl(n) chance of correctly guessing b. Also note that the distributions X b and Y b for a random b are -close due to the -correctness of the obfuscation. More formally, the distributions X b and Y b could be defined over the same sampling space using: random seeds of key generation, obfuscation, encryption, and bit b. This way with probability ≥ 1 − (and by the -approximate correctness of the obfuscation) the actual sampled values of X b and Y b will be equal, and this implies that they are -close. As a result, when we switch the distribution of the challenge given to the adversary and give a sample of Y b (for random b) instead of a sample from X b , the adversary's chance of guessing b correctly can increase at most by and reach at most 1/2 + negl + . Therefore, the new scheme is ( + negl)-secure according to Definition 21. 
